Whether motivated by clean energy technology ambitions or supply chain security, critical minerals initiatives have increasingly shown the importance of proactive, targeted support. But the current federal mining regulatory landscape does not allow sufficient adaptability to effectively implement such strategies, chiefly because existing processes do not manage critical minerals apart from other types of mining. Therefore, a regulatory framework dedicated to critical minerals is necessary to coherently organize individual policies over the long term at scales commensurate with national progress toward a new technological age. Without regulating critical minerals differently, policymakers risk limiting themselves to piecemeal actions, like project grants and mapping campaigns (USGS, 2019; DOD, 2022; DOE, 2022; DOD, 2023). Alternatively, continuing to treat all hardrock mining as a single inseparable bucket may encourage ineffective and unnecessarily broad, industrywide reforms. This is no mere theoretical risk, as such sweeping approaches to regulatory improvement already show up in venues like the Department of the Interior’s Interagency Working Group report (IWG) and the recently passed Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023 (DOI IWG, 2023; FRA, 2023).

The central problem is that while the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) nominally designates the list of critical minerals based on supply chain and trade criteria, regulatory agencies use a different, older, parallel system that organizes all types of mineral commodities into classifications based instead on practical aspects of overseeing their stewardship and extraction. The USGS and regulatory agencies perform different functions, so different classification strategies are not inherently problematic – the issue is rather that regulatory agencies do not have a classification for critical minerals that mirrors the USGS list. Instead, “locatable minerals” include nearly all hardrock minerals and are governed by the General Mining Law of 1872 (GML), “leasable minerals” include mainly energy minerals, like oil and gas, which fall under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 (MLA), and “saleable minerals” include industrial materials, like sand and gravel, organized under the Materials Act of 1947 (BLM, 2023).

The commodities the USGS designates as critical minerals are almost exclusively hardrock minerals that are subject to the GML. For a long time, the uniform regulatory treatment of critical minerals like any other generic commodity in the hardrock mining sector was perhaps appropriate. However, intensifying supply chain risks and growth in new strategic technology sectors over the past decade or more make it increasingly timely to establish separate planning, permitting, and regulatory processes for critical minerals. A maximally ambitious approach could involve Congress establishing a new regulatory classification that matches the USGS list of critical minerals. This new classification could pull critical minerals out from under the GML and MLA into its own jurisdiction, which would stand in parallel with and analogous to the existing categories of locatable, leasable, and saleable minerals. But at the very least, federal policy efforts to strengthen critical mineral supply chains must comprehensively target critical minerals as a category, as opposed to diluting resources across the whole hardrock mining sector or eternally playing catch-up with individual grants and fast-tracked projects.

In this article we outline a number of specific provisions for strengthening critical minerals strategies, but our fundamental recommendations involve a regulatory infrastructure that systematically distinguishes critical minerals management from other hardrock mining, which policymakers can amend or augment as national needs evolve. Labor and industry stakeholders throughout the advanced technology sectors likely understand the value of targeted regulatory support, which would otherwise be quickly diluted if applied to all of hardrock mining. Meanwhile, environmental advocates concerned about mining impacts must appreciate that efforts to incentivize and accelerate production of strategic minerals can take place in conjunction with continued commitments to environmental and social protection. In any case, we can no longer afford policies that crudely lump critical minerals together with the rest of hardrock mining in general.

This study 1) explains why improved performance of national agricultural research and extension systems (NARES) is required to achieve many widely shared development objectives of African governments and international partners, 2) examines the effectiveness of international efforts to build the capacities of African NARES, and 3) proposes actions to improve the performance of these systems.

Research on this topic has been impeded by the lack of data on the behaviors of, and interactions between, organizations operating in the agricultural research, development, and extension (R&D&E) space in developing countries. Most available quantitative data lack the depth or nuanced context specificity to shed light on complex institutional behavior. Hence, this study primarily derives its findings from in-depth interviews of individuals with longstanding direct experience working in African NARES and international organizations with a mandate to strengthen the capacities of African NARES. In addition to these, key informant (KI) interviews of 26 senior representatives of African and international agricultural R&D&E institutions and three international donor organizations, the study also draws upon available secondary data on national R&D expenditures and scientific capacity.

The study identifies seven recurrent themes emerging from the KI interviews: (i) building strong NARES will initially require a regional approach for many countries; (ii) sustained commitment and funding from African governments is a precondition for building strong NARES and regional and continental agricultural R&D&E systems; (iii) organizations within the international agricultural research system (IARS) often profess to be strengthening the capacities of the NARES, but their overall contribution has been limited; (iv) the effectiveness of donor funding to the IARS depends on strengthening the NARES; (v) donors should confront the issue of creating organizations that duplicate activities of the NARES; (vi) it is important to integrate nutritional objectives into NARES priorities; (vii) there is a need to recognize and strengthen the performance of tertiary education systems.

The study emphasizes the need to differentiate between individual and institutional capacity development. Most key informants concluded that donors and international partners have increased the number of professional African agricultural scientists while contributing relatively little to the institutional capacities of African NARES. Many of these scientists have joined the ranks of international research centers and universities rather than African NARES. Without institutional capacity development of the African NARES, international research centers will continue to draw talent away from the NARES.

Based on the weight of KI perspectives, the study concludes by proposing that African governments and African development organizations build a 21st-century NARES in which research is defined, prioritized, and implemented by NARES with the IARS being in service to the NARES. Achieving this vision will require action by actors including African development agencies and governments, leadership within the NARES, the CGIAR and other international research organizations, donors, and the private sector.