Russia Rejoices in Celebration of Soccer, but Bad Memories Loom
The start of the 2018 World Cup (June 14–July 15) had everything that the millions of soccer fans in Russia could wish for: perfectly prepared stadiums, a beautiful and short opening ceremony, and the spectacular performance of the national team. The country has, indeed, come together and rejoiced in welcoming what is often considered the world’s greatest sporting event, which will be watched with keen attention in every inhabited corner of the globe. For the past eight years, 11 cities in Russia’s European part had been preparing to greet thousands of foreign tourists, and the joyful atmosphere in Moscow resembles the capital’s breathtaking opening to the world during the 1957 Festival of Youth and Students (Gazeta.ru, June 14). Alexei Navalny, a defiant leader of the “non-systemic” opposition, has sardonically praised the beautification of the Moscow prison, which has been transformed into a hotel-type establishment ready to accommodate “overenthusiastic” fans (Navalny.com, June 15). Yet, behind this euphoria loom reflections on the perfectly organized 1980 Olympics in Moscow, which marked the terminal decline of the Soviet Union accelerated by the war in Afghanistan, and on the spectacular 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, which became a preamble to Russia’s brutal aggression in Ukraine (Novaya Gazeta, June 12).
President Vladimir Putin himself is not a fan of the most popular game in the world, but he is keen to maximally exploit its huge geopolitical resonance. At the opening match, he showed all due respect to Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman and feigned profound surprise at the overwhelming victory of the Russian team (Svoboda.org, June 15). Indeed, for him it was a useful opportunity to discuss further oil production limits by Russia and the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Moscow would like the price to stay in the “comfortable level” of $70–80 per barrel, as Igor Sechin, Putin’s oil-confidant and CEO of the state-owned energy giant Rosneft, put it (RBC, June 15). The colossal expenses from building the infrastructure for the World Cup are not expected to yield any net financial profits, but at least the diplomatic and propaganda dividends can be harvested (Forbes.ru, June 13).
Sporting excitement notwithstanding, the country’s economic problems persist. And the government has decided that the happy moment of the arrival of the long-awaited soccer party provides perfect cover for the inevitable decision to raise the retirement age (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, June 14). Many officials are worried that this painful hit to social benefits (men’s retirement age will gradually be adjusted from 60 to 65, while women face even greater change—from 55 to 63) may lead to protests (Vedomosti, June 15). Putin, meanwhile, has distanced himself from this act, pushing the responsibility squarely on the government and reserving for himself the option to show benevolence by adjusting the new rules by a year or two (Moskovsky Komsomolets, June 15). What might have even greater impact on business dynamics was the decision to increase the value added tax (VAT)—which has made it impossible for the Central Bank to cut interest rates (Kommersant, June 16). Economic stagnation, instead of the breakthrough prescribed by Putin (see EDM, May 3, 17), remains the most likely prospect for Russia, even with the “comfortable” volume of petro-revenues (Republic.ru, June 15).
Sobering up to these economic realities may happen sometime in the autumn; but presently, Russia is happy to escape Western ostracism and forget about the sanctions and its smoldering wars in Syria and eastern Ukraine (Moscow echo, June 15). Putin, nevertheless, finds it important to combine soccer diplomacy with demonstrations of Russia’s might. One example has been the large-scale exercise of the Northern Fleet, which sailed into the Barents Sea with 36 combat ships, auxiliary vessels and submarines. The navy’s only aircraft carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov, which has started long repairs, was absent, as was its flagship, the nuclear cruiser Petr Velikii, which awaits its turn for overhaul (TASS, June 13). This surprise show of naval power is quite possibly intended to reinforce the diplomatic warning to Oslo that Moscow is highly displeased with Norway’s intention to invite the United States to increase to 700 the force of US Marines training in the northern fjords (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, June 14). Simultaneously, a different kind of demonstration is developing in the Sea of Azov, where Russia has redeployed several missile ships from the Caspian Flotilla (Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, June 7; see EDM, May 31, June 11).
This combination of soccer “soft power” and demonstrative military “hard power” is supposed to prove Russia’s relevance on the international arena. What could confer credibility to these maneuvers is the prospect of Putin meeting with US President Donald Trump (see EDM, June 14), and the Russian mainstream media has been applying a heavy spin on this theme (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, June 16). The unprecedented row at the G7 summit, where Trump offended US allies in many unexpected ways, including by suggesting that Russia be readmitted into this club of advanced industrial democracies, is seen as particularly beneficial to the Russian cause (Russiancouncil.ru, June 13). Trump’s success in Singapore, during his summit with North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un, is expected to pave the way for an equally high-profile heads-of-state meeting with Putin (Carnegie.ru, June 12). The Kremlin needs to find something to put on the table, and the dumping by the Russian Central Bank of half of its portfolio of US government bonds may be intended to remind the White House of Russia’s financial clout (RIA Novosti, June 15).
Moscow tries to move quickly with various initiatives, knowing that the uplifting effect of the good start to the World Cup will not last long—moreover, the continued smooth course of the month-long tournament is by no means guaranteed. Even barring any organizational setback or terrorist attack (see EDM, April 24), the soccer championship will be over by mid-July, and August has frequently brought bad luck in the past (Sobesednik, May 30). The exorbitantly expensive sports showcase will undoubtedly leave Russia with crowds of boisterous fans, discontented aging workers agitated about their pensions, and deeply worried neighbors, who know full well Russia’s propensity to upset the international order while global attention is turned to other spectacles. In the four years since the Sochi Olympics, Russia has moved far along the track of economic decline and political despotism. But it has also gained much experience in executing “hybrid” (“New Type”) interventions abroad. Moscow will, thus, almost certainly continue to test the limits of Western resolve to contain its export of conflict and corruption.
--Pavel K. Baev
Russia’s Push for Militarization of the Arctic Continues
In 2015, speaking before the Federation Council (the upper chamber of the Russian parliament), Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin accused the West of “inflaming anti-Russian propaganda” related to Russia’s alleged militarization of the Arctic region (RIA Novosti, November 20, 2015). However, merely two years later, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu affirmed that the Ministry of Defense had, in effect, already completed all planned major facilities (including military ones) in the Arctic. He also declared, “For the entire history of the Arctic region, no single state had managed to develop infrastructure, including energy-related and military facilities, as impressive as what Russia has accomplished” (RIA Novosti, December 25, 2017). Now, the latest news coming from the region points to an even larger push by Russia to pursue comprehensive military build-up in the Arctic, including by bolstering local tank forces, air-defense missile systems, naval forces, strategic aviation and locally based special operations forces.
On June 5, the Russian daily Izvestia reported that the Arctic Troops would soon add the newly modified version of the T-80 main battle tank—the T-80BVM—to their arsenals (Izvestia, June 5, 2018). This advanced model boasts a wide range of superior upgrades, including:
- The ability to effectively operate under challenging climactic conditions (well below -40° Fahrenheit/-40° Celsius), thanks to its modified turboshaft engine, similar to those used in helicopters;
- Profound advancements in speed and maneuvering;
- An upgraded fire-control system (Sosna-U), which increases the level of effectiveness and range of fire; as well as
- The Refleks integrated, laser-guided anti-tank missile.
In assessing this news, the former head of the Main Automotive-Armored Directorate of the Ministry of Defense (GABTU), Colonel General Sergei Mayev, stated that T-80BVMs will help Russia secure military superiority in the High North (Bezformata.ru, June 6). All in all, the Russian defense ministry expects to deploy at least 100 of these modernized tanks to troops stationed in the Arctic. Those developments have also demonstrated the premature nature of previous prognoses given in 2013, stating that, by 2020, the T-80 will gradually be phased out of service (Politros.com, accessed June 9).
Additionally, the Russian side has been extensively testing the Pantsir-SA—an “Arctic model” of the Pantsir-S1 (NATO classification: SA-22 Greyhound) short-to-medium-range surface-to-air missile system. The trials are being conducted north of the Polar Circle, suggesting that this weaponry will likely soon be integrated into Russia’s Arctic military forces (see EDM, January 30). Tests have revealed the ineffectiveness of the conventional Pantsir system’s anti-aircraft gun in the High North’s severe climactic conditions. As such, the autocannon guns have been removed, while the number of onboard missiles was increased from 12 to 18 (Nation-news.ru, December 1, 2017).
In terms of naval power in the Arctic region, Russia’s reliance on submarines as a means to achieve military superiority will continue to increase. Recently, the commander of the Northern Fleet, Nikolai Evmenov, confirmed the constant presence of Russian submarines in Arctic waters. Additionally, he stated that, when it comes to wielding the most modern equipment, “the Northern Fleet is not only in step with the times but, according to certain indicators, it is even ahead” (RIA Novosti, June 1, 2018).
Meanwhile, in the domain of strategic aviation, the defense ministry intends to actively engage Tupolev Tu-160 supersonic heavy strategic bombers in “the task of increasing the level of protection of Russia’s Arctic region.” It is worth noting that, in recent years, Russia has upgraded the Tu-160, providing for a “much broader latitude of use” of this platform. Most importantly the aircraft has been outfitted with the ability to refuel in the air, thus vastly increasing its operational period (Redstar.ru, May 18).
Finally, in addition to these “technical” improvements, Russia has also been working to boost the “human” component of its forces guarding the Arctic. Notably, last April, in Murmansk, the Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) launched a series of tactical exercises, supervised by the special service’s head, Viktor Zolotov. These exercises aimed to achieve the following objectives (Voenno-Promyshlenny Kurier, April 11, 2018):
- To test the system of command and control (C2) in conditions of the Far North;
- To synchronize joint actions between the Rosgvardia and locally deployed units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), the Federal Security Service (FSB) and the Ministry of Emergency Situations (MChS); and
- To rehearse various options for protecting the objects and infrastructure belonging to Rosatomflot, which maintains the country’s fleet of nuclear-powered icebreakers.
The last stage of the April Arctic exercises envisaged the Russian special forces, jointly with border guard troops, “halting and defeating a terrorist group.” The special forces involved included the 1st Special Purpose Unit of the Internal Forces “Vityaz,” the Special Rapid Response Unit (SOBR) “Rys,” and the SOBR “Terek.”
On the basis of these developments, Russia’s continuing militarization of the Arctic region appears to be premised on two main (in many respects, mutually supporting) objectives. First, Moscow is trying to secure its version of the “Silk Road Project”—the Northern Sea Route—with its huge natural resources and strategic geopolitical importance. Second, Russia is seeking to enhance regional military security by implementing a “multi-layered system of defense” built on the Syrian experience, which is likely to lead to the creation of one or more Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) “bubble(s)” in the Russian High North. As such, Moscow can be expected to further develop its Arctic units’ Electronic Warfare (EW) capabilities—an area in which the Russian side feels superior to the United States (Voenno-Promyshlenny Kurier, June 8).
--Sergey Sukhankin
As SCO Admits New Members, Central Asian Countries Want Greater Focus on Economic Issues
From June 8 to 10, the Chinese port city of Qingdao hosted the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s (SCO) annual head of states meeting. For the first time, seventeen years after the creation of SCO in 2001, the organization officially welcomed new members—India and Pakistan. Two years ago, when talks of enlarging the SCO turned serious, Central Asian member states, in particular Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, were the least enthusiastic about the expansion (see EDM, June 29, 2016). Astana and Tashkent feared that having the world’s top two most populous countries as members, importing protracted India-Pakistan tensions into the SCO, as well as Russian diplomatic intrigues meant to exploit the former could easily divert the organization’s focus away from Central Asia.
Economic development is the top priority for Central Asian countries today, and they want the SCO to pay increased attention to this issue. As such, the SCO’s Central Asian member states increasingly see this organization as a platform to voice their economic aspirations and promote their economic projects. To be sure, at the Qingdao meeting, Central Asian governments did also discuss “harder” security issues, including fighting terrorism and illicit drug trafficking; but they—especially Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan—clearly wanted to put more emphasis on economics.
For Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyaev, increasing regional trade was the top agenda point at Qingdao. While praising the 30 percent growth in trade between SCO countries and Uzbekistan since the beginning of 2018, he called for boosting these numbers further by creating expedited border crossing points for agricultural products. Mirziyaev also stressed the importance of building the Uzbekistan–Kyrgyzstan–China railroad as well as the Mazar i Sharif–Herat railroad, planned by Uzbekistan, and the development of transportation corridors from Central Asia to the Persian Gulf (President.uz, June 10; UzA.uz, June 11).
Kazakhstan’s Nursultan Nazarbayev, meanwhile, announced the launch of the “Astana” financial center and did not hide his concerns over global monetary instability and its adverse effects on his country. As such, Nazarbayev proposed payments in national currencies among SCO countries as a way to mediate the situation. He also called for the intensification of regional investment projects and recommended building a high-speed railway to connect China with Germany via Astana and Moscow (President.kz, Forbes.kz, June 10). Kyrgyzstani President Sooronbay Jeenbekov focused on the soon-to-be complete CASA-1000 project, which will allow it to export electricity to Afghanistan and Pakistan. During the SCO summit, Bishkek’s delegation also raised the country’s role in the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative as well as its support for the Uzbekistan–Kyrgyzstan–China railroad (President.kg, June 10). Tajikistan’s representative, President Emomali Rahmon, limited his remarks on the economy to simply outlining the significance of the region’s transit potential (President.tj, June 10).
The SCO heads of state summits also serve as an important platform for bilateral meetings. For Uzbekistan’s president, most of his tête-à-têtes in Qingdao did not go beyond trite diplomatic exchanges. The exceptions, however, were his one-on-one meetings with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping. In his talks with Putin on the sidelines of the SCO summit, Mirziyaev stressed the unchanged state of strategic relations between the two countries (President.uz, June 9). In light of Mirziyaev’s visit to the United States last month (May 15–17) and rumors of Moscow’s concerns about Tashkent’s possible cozying up with Washington, these assurances were surely meant to dissipate any such anxieties coming from the Kremlin (BBC—Uzbek service, May 17).
Meanwhile, in his meeting with Xi, Uzbekistan’s leader proposed developing cooperative region-to-region partnerships between the two countries, thus signaling a desire to shift bilateral relations away from a purely Tashkent-Beijing axis (President.uz, June 9). Since coming to power, Mirziyaev has introduced inter-regional cooperation models with several of Uzbekistan’s neighbors, whereby designated regions of Uzbekistan hold regular meetings with regions of foreign countries. Now, he seems to be promoting similar sub-state-level interactions with Chinese provinces.
While the presidents of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan limited their visits to Qingdao to participating only in the SCO summit, the leaders of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan also secured important meetings outside of the SCO format, which resulted in procuring needed Chinese funds. Notably, the Kazakh-Chinese Business Council (held in Beijing, on June 7) concluded by signing $13 billion dollars’ worth of investment deals. And the two governments initiated a joint Eurasian Nurly (Bright) Investment Fund, worth $500 million dollars (Kazinform.kz, Kazakhstan Today, June 8). Whereas, Kyrgyzstan’s President Jeenbekov held a state visit to China prior to the SCO summit and obtained a 600 million yuan (around $90 million) grant to fund infrastructure projects in his country (24.kg, June 7).
After the addition of new SCO members, the Central Asian republics may find themselves grappling with possible diminished roles at future summit meetings. But for China, security on its western border as well as along the borders of the five Central Asian states are crucial issues for the SCO to address. Therefore, Beijing can be expected to continue to push for the full engagement of the Central Asian capitals within this regional organization. For Central Asian countries, the SCO structure will remain a useful platform for bilateral meetings as well as to advocate for multinational economic projects; and the recent enlargement of the SCO could actually be a positive development in this regard.
--Umida Hashimova
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