Since its inception, BRI has been discussed in both positive and negative lights. Of the latter type, ‘debt-trap diplomacy’ has been a common negative trope, expression, myth, meme or frame of reference in which the operational logic of BRI has been discussed. Deborah Brautigam, a prominent China scholar from Johns Hopkins University, has referred to this expression as ‘the rise of a meme’ that was born in 2017 in an Indian think tank and got quickly adopted by Western governments, intelligence circles, and media (see D. Brautigam, A critical look at Chinese ‘debt-trap diplomacy’, 2019). She argues that the Chinese involvement in Africa, Asia, and South America ‘challenges the media spin’ about Chinese ‘debt-trap diplomacy’ in these regions.
A new Chatham House report makes a similar case and calls this discursive ploy a ‘myth’ [Debunking the Myth of ‘Debt-trap Diplomacy’] by arguing that the recipient countries equally shape the operational logic of the BRI. The report contends that there is no singular (and according to the myth, cynical) Chinese investment strategy as ‘China’s development financing system is too fragmented and poorly coordinated to pursue detailed strategic objectives’. The other major issue that this myth ignores is the very agency of the recipient countries. It portrays China as an all-powerful evil actor and recipient countries as completely powerless and devoid of agency. The report argues that the recipient governments (‘and their associated political and economic interests’) to a large extent determine the nature of the BRI on their own territory. In Sri Lanka and Malaysia, the two mostly cited ‘victims’ of this ‘trap’, the controversial projects were initiated by the recipient governments themselves. Finally, the report recommends better risk assessment on the part of Chinese actors and more national coordination, risk evaluation, and bearing of responsibilities on the part of the recipient countries.
M. Forough
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