From Pakistan and Tajikistan to Bangladesh and Indonesia, the Belt and Road Initiative’s key routes are rooted in regions with a predominantly Muslim population. It comes as no surprise then that good relations with Islamic countries and actors are of critical importance to the successful implementation of the BRI and China’s overall ambitions as a global player.
China’s investment pattern in such regions is consistent with its behaviour elsewhere – it is largely grounded in pragmatism. And while the Islamic world is not monolithic, generally speaking, the majority of the countries have eagerly welcomed China’s invitation for cooperation.
The PRC’s global engagement, however, is not the only thing that is catching the eye of countries and non-state actors alike. China's crackdown on and repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang has fueled jihadist animosity throughout Asia and beyond. While prominent groups like the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant have been silent on China’s imprisonment of Uyghurs, this causes other militant organizations to view China in a negative light.
Besides rhetoric, China might have already experienced jihadism on its soil in relation to the Xinjiang situation with the 2014 Kunming railway station attack, when a group of eight terrorists murdered 31 civilians. Whether BRI projects across the world will be met with jihad is largely dependent on China’s policy decisions at home and the extent to which they echo throughout the Muslim world. Even if the attitude towards Xinjiang is softened, it will become more and more difficult for Beijing to manage the militant threat that is surrounding some BRI projects as China continues to draw more attention to its footprint.
Mirela Petkova
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