With infrastructure financing being a key part of the BRI, some countries accumulate excessive foreign debt to China. A number of institutions such as Johns Hopkins’ China-Africa Research Initiative and Australia’s Lowy Institute have researched the lending procedures and they have established that seizing strategic assets as collateral is not an often-used element in China’s strategy [‘Debt trap' diplomacy is a card China seldom plays in Belt and Road initiative].
A new Clingendael report makes a similar case looking at the Western Balkans [China and the EU in the Western Balkans]. China’s infrastructure-related lending to the region is significant, but (at least so far) it does not present an example of a debt-trap diplomacy. However, China’s engagement reinforces the argument of the centrality of the BRI to China’s foreign policy. The countries of strategic importance to China are the ones of direct relevance to its infrastructure connectivity goals and the BRI: Serbia and North Macedonia.
If the cooperation between China and the Western Balkans countries proves successful in the long term, this may pave the road for increased Chinese engagement with neighbouring regions such as the Black Sea region [Black Sea economies poised to take advantage of a post-pandemic climate]. Given the Black Sea’s major natural gas and oil reserves, some future BRI projects may aim to connect the region’s oil-producing countries with international markets.
Mirela Petkova
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