Critics mention debt-trap diplomacy in the same breath with BRI, to persuade developing countries not to engage with the foreign policy of China. The underlying concern is that China might use BRI-loans (mostly asset-backed lendings which are frequently related to infrastructure) to use its (soft) power to extend its influence. Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka is a prime example. Its 100-year lease might be considered a pound of flesh by some, and has similarities with the deal between China and Great Britain surrounding the sovereignty of Hong Kong, of which the seeds can be traced back to the treaty of Nanking.
Yet the Covid-19 virus has its own impact on the globe and few countries remain untouched. It is safe to say that this pandemic and its consequences, will alter our way of life, e.g. pending recession and depression. Austerity measures are looming in the shade. Already, fundamental rights are being suspended in order to stop the spread, e.g. house-arrests, privacy.
To quote former US-president John F. Kennedy: ‘In the Chinese language, the word "crisis" is composed of two characters, one representing danger and the other, opportunity.’ In this light the fact that more and more countries have expressed their willingness to sue China for damages in relation to the spreading of the virus is an interesting development.
From a legal perspective it is interesting to witness how these claims are going to be put forth. Will there be a global class action suit, and which court will be deemed competent? Would the WTO play a role in it? Will parties revert to arbitration? The global legal system is gearing up as we speak. Nigerian lawyers want to sue China for a substantial amount. It is creative to serve legal documents via the Nigerian embassy. The effectiveness has yet to be seen. Already, several countries voiced their opinion of culpability and/or responsibility for the outbreak, e.g. United States, Israel, France and Germany. Perhaps the Nigerian lawyers are not standing alone.
What is at stake? I believe, in essence: ‘trust’. Mainly from state and affiliated private actors. China developed and cultivated goodwill within its region, and on a global level, amongst others via BRI. This goodwill was damaged (to a degree) due to the spread of Covid-19. Providing medical equipment and supplies can be considered damage control. However, other countries provided China with medical equipment and supplies when the virus broke out in Wuhan earlier this year. In this light it is difficult to qualify the Chinese medical supplies as giving back or aid. And it certainly can't be linked to the BRI. An appropriate response is yet to be seen.
Furthermore, there are some reports that the medical equipment and supplies offered by China or Chinese companies didn't always deliver what was agreed upon, although the Chinese companies promised to be transparent. Regardless of that, the demand for these supplies is disproportionately high on a global level, whilst the supply is concentrated, and very low. The causes for these shortages remain murky at best.
It is not unimaginable that aforementioned proceedings can be used as leverage by BRI-countries in current and future BRI-negotiations. But more importantly in order to attain the current influence one might ask, where is the pound of flesh coming from?
Ali Çikmazkara
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