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ICAS Issue Primer: Previewing America's DPRK Policy
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Previewing America's 2018 DPRK Policy

The Next Six Months will witness the Highest Level of Tension on the Korean Peninsula since the Cessation of the Korean War in 1953

By Sourabh Gupta

Key Takeaways

  • The risk of a U.S.-initiated breakout of war, which could include a nuclear dimension as the conflict escalates, is as relatively low. Numerically, the risk is less than 30 percent – and probably much lower. Because North Korea (DPRK) is in a position to inflict unacceptable human losses on Seoul and U.S. assets in the region if the United States initiates a conflict, the consensus view in Washington is that the Trump administration will be deterred from initiating armed hostilities against North Korea.
  • The risk of a U.S.-initiated breakout of war on the Korean peninsula is nevertheless at its highest level since the armistice agreement that terminated the Korean War hostilities in 1953. Not since then has the evaluation by a U.S. administration of the threat status posed by North Korea been as high as it is today.   
  • The risk of a U.S.-initiated breakout of war on the Korean peninsula has not yet peaked, and will continue to increase. The next 6 months will likely witness the highest-ever levels of tension on the Korean peninsula since 1953. The risk of a U.S.-initiated breakout of war, which could include a nuclear dimension as the conflict escalates, could even cross the 50 percent threshold during this time. 
  • The key reason for this extremely elevated level of tension over the next 6 months is due to the Trump Administration’s primary policy focus vis-à-vis the DPRK: to deny North Korea the assured combat-ready capability to strike the continental United States with a nuclear-tipped missile. This does not necessarily mean that the administration will initiate a preventive or preemptive strike (or war) against North Korea. The United States will most likely learn to live with North Korea in a deterrence relationship once the latter perfects this capability. But for the time being, the overriding goal is primarily to deny North Korea the assured capability to hit America with a nuclear-tipped missile – by way of military means and economic strangulation (or diplomacy).
  • Despite the anticipated spike in tensions, there is guarded hope among specialists and observers that the two sides will avoid a military confrontation. Both sides will likely engage in aggressive posturing during this period, but, at the end of the day, each side will be dissuaded from pulling the trigger. Mutual deterrence will hold. The scope for a miscalculation, nevertheless, during this period however will be very high. The United States is set to conduct another round of joint military drills with South Korea in late-spring 2018,which Pyongyang typically views as a prelude to invasion. 
  • The United States’ recent signaling of a qualified willingness to explore “talks about talks” with North Korea without the precondition of a prior commitment by Pyongyang to denuclearize, could lower the relative temperature on the peninsula during this period ahead. So long as: (a) a request is made by Kim Jong-un or a senior representative directly to the United States in this regard; and (b) North Korea commits to a sustained cessation of nuclear and missile testing as well as threatening behavior ahead of the talks, and during these talks, the U.S. appears willing to explore the potential for dialogue. Whether these dialogue threads will amount to much during this period of aggressive posturing remains to be seen. At best, it could provide a foundation for future bilateral and multilateral engagement once the period of high tension has elapsed.  
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